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Abstract
This article is concerned with how we make decisions based on how problems are presented to us and the effect that the framing of the
problem might have on our choices. Current philosophical and psychological accounts of the framing effect in experiments such as the
Asian Disease Problem (ADP) concern reference points and domains (gains and losses). We question the importance of reference points
and domains. Instead, we adopt a linguistic perspective focussing on the role of the evaluative polarity evoked by the words -- negative
and positive -- used to describe the options in the decision problem. We show that the evaluative polarity of the different wordings in the
ADP better explain participants’ behaviour than reference points and domains. We propose two models in which the values given to
evaluative polarity words (their valence) directly influence the strength of framing. The results indicate that linguistic considerations
regarding evaluative polarity have to be considered in relation to the ADP. The account resembles Fuzzy-Trace-Theory but allows for the
strength of evaluative polarity to directly affect behaviour. In the discussion, we also assess how evaluative polarity relates to negation,
antonyms and the communicative frame within which the choices are presented.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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In spite of the fact that decision making plays an important role in most professional and everyday situations in which
human beings are involved, and in spite of the fact that information about options more often than not are presented
through language, decision making is not a topic that has generated much interest in the linguistics literature. In contrast,
human decision making has been the topic of a great deal of active research in philosophy, psychology and cognitive
science, and research carried out in those areas has primarily been concerned with human performance in decision
making in terms of people's needs, preferences and values.
A topic that has received extensive attention in that literature is framing, i.e. the way in which information about options
is presented to decision makers. This has been shown to have a great impact on the decisions being made. A framing
effect is said to occur when people's inferences or preferences change with different, but logically equivalent descriptions
of the same decision problem. Despite the fact that the presentation of the options are provided through the medium of* Corresponding author. Fax: +46 46 2223228.
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research. This is, however, what this article is about. More precisely, we investigate the effect the actual words used to
present options have on decisions made in Tversky's and Kahneman's (1981) Asian Disease Problem (henceforth, ADP).
The ADP provides participants with a cover story about a disease, which is expected to kill a given number of people. In
the original ADP experiment, two groups of participants were asked to choose between two programs that have equal
expected value for combating the disease as follows.
Cover story
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Version 1
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be
saved.
Version 2
 If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.One of the groups of participants was asked to make a decision on the basis of Version 1 and the other group on the
basis of Version 2. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that 72% of participants chose Program A in Version 1, while
78% of participants chose Program B in Version 2. This result is surprising in the sense that the numerical outcomes of the
variants are identical in both versions; they only differ with respect to how the information is presented, i.e. framing. In the
literature, the framing effect is often explained with reference to Prospect theory, which is an empirically based formal
theory. Prospect theory states that people are risk seeking when they encounter potential losses and risk averse when
they encounter possible gains. This raises the question of why Version 1 and Version 2 differ with respect to whether they
are potential losses or potential gains since the outcomes are identical. Rather than appealing to the domains of gains and
losses and reference points as in Prospect theory, we propose that the explanation for the participants’ different
preferences is related to the opposite evaluative polarities of the antonymic words used to communicate the outcomes of
the options to the participants, i.e. save (positive) and die (negative) and the effect that negation has when it combines with
save and die as in ‘no people will be saved’, i.e. all die, and ‘nobody will die’, i.e. all saved.
The purpose of this study is to provide a model that can be used to make predictions about people's choices when they
are asked to make risky choice decisions related to the ADP. We argue that it is the evaluative polarity of the words used to
communicate the options that is the crucial factor in decision making, rather than the domains of gains and losses as
argued in Prospect theory. The predictions for how the evaluative polarities of the expressions mentioned above
determine people's choices are analyzed from the perspective of different interpretive models of the Gains-and-Losses
Account and the Evaluative-Polarity Account. We explore if and to what extent words such as save or die may make
participants risk seeking or risk averse. Our reasoning is presented step by step, starting with two versions of the ideas
advanced in Prospect theory, namely the Gains-and-Losses Account (Section 2.1) and the Minimal-Gains-and-Losses
Account (Section 2.2). Using those as stepping-stones, we then develop three new models for the analysis of lexical
semantic interpretations of the ADP, where evaluative polarity words are crucial cues in decision making. We begin with a
simple version of what we refer to as the Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account (Section 3.2), which is further developed
into the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account (Section 3.3) and even further into the Extended-Relative-Evaluative-
Polarity Account (Section 3.4). The Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account and the Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity
Account are the versions that differ most radically from the accounts based on Prospect theory, described in Sections 2.1
and 2.2. Their predictive strengths are empirically tested in two different experiments. The results of the experiments are
reported in their respective section (Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1). Section 4 summarizes the results of the whole study in a
general discussion. Two main claims are made: The evaluative polarity expressed through the words in the ADP influence
people's risky choice preferences, and evaluative polarity is more important than domains when it comes to understanding
framing effects of the ADP type.
2. The Gains-and-Losses Accounts
As already mentioned in the introduction, the options that decision makers choose between in the ADP are perfectly
symmetrical. This means that any theory that sets out to explain the framing effect by reference to gains or losses will have
to explain why 200 people saved out of 600 expected to die, is a gain, whereas 400 dead out of 600 expected to die is a
loss. We introduce two different ways in which Prospect theory can explain this finding, first within the Gains-and-Losses
Account, and then within the slightly modified Minimal-Gains-and-Losses account. Since Prospect theory is a purely
formal theory, a number of assumptions have to be added in order to explain the ADP. The two versions presented in this
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Fig. 1. The flowchart summarizes the Gains-and-Losses Account of the framing effect (for details on (1)--(3), see text). The table illustrates how
the account works for Versions 1 (first row) and 2 (second row) of the ADP.section represent our understanding of how this could be done. The discussion of the two Gains-and-Losses Accounts is
used as a springboard and a motivation for the main objective of this study, namely to propose a linguistically oriented
attempt to explain the framing effect of the ADP, which we do in Section 3.
2.1. The Gains-and-Losses Account
The Gains-and-Losses Account in this section is one out of potentially several representations of how the framing
effect can be explained in Prospect theory. It is designed to clarify the relationship between reference points and domains.
The Gains-and-Losses Account states that the words (saved or die) used to describe the options determine which
reference point in the cover story (600 people dead or 0 people dead) is the reference point of the problem. The reference
points, in turn, determine whether an option is seen as belonging to the domain of either gains or losses. A positive
deviation from the reference point is a gain, and a negative deviation a loss (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981:454). Once the
option is appropriately fixed as either a gain or a loss, Prospect theory predicts that participants are more likely to be either
risk averse or risk seeking (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981:453). The Gains-and-Losses account is based on three
assumptions:(1) 1 A
from The words used to describe options determine the reference point;
(2) The reference point defines the domain of the option (gain or loss);
(3) The domain influences the choice.The relation between Assumptions (1), (2) and (3) is depicted by means of a flowchart in Fig. 1. The flowchart describes
how the words used to describe options (1) determine the reference point (2) which in turn determines the domain (3),
which influences the choice.
Starting from the end of the flow, we know that there is evidence in the literature that the domain influences the options,
as stated in Assumption (3). This is a result of the so-called reflection effect, which shows that participants behave
differently when they face gains and losses, i.e. in cases where the expected outcomes are not equivalent (see Markowitz,
1959; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 for early empirical evidence; note, however that Fagley, 1993 claims that the
evidence is mixed). This is evidence that goes beyond that which is provided by the ADP, which is of importance for the
explanatory power of the model. There is not much that can be added to Assumption (2), which comprises the definition of
domains in terms of reference points according to Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
Assumption (1) predicts that the words used to describe the options determine the reference point. This assumption is
problematic because it is by no means a trivial operation to infer people's reference points from their choices (Fischoff,
1983). An important issue for the Gains-and-Losses Account is how the reference point changes with the words used to
describe the options. The Gains-and-Losses Account provides no such explanation. It simply assumes that it does, as
pointed out by, among others, Fujii and Takemura (2003:54). Note also in relation to Assumption (1) that negation is not
taken into account. The words referred to in this assumption are only saved and die, and not the contributions of negation in
combination with saved and die. The model has nothing to say about the meaning of not saved, and not die or how possible
reversals of evaluative polarity influence the participants’ decisions (cf. Kühberger, 1995:231, and the discussion below).
One explanation for how reference points may become fixed is provided if we first assume that Version 1 of the ADP
(the version using saved) activates the reference point 600 people dead, while Version 2 (the version using die) activates
the reference point 0 people dead. If this is the case, then 200 saved out of 600 expected deaths belongs to the domain of
gains at the same time as 400 dead out of 0 dead belongs to the domain of losses.1 Thus, 200 saved out of 600 expected natural extension of this definition is to classify the option as belonging to the domain of gains, if its expected value is a positive deviation
the reference point, and the reverse for losses.
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negative deviation from the reference point (a loss). Different versions of this explanation can be found in Maule
(1989:165), Kühberger (1995:231) and McKenzie and Nelson (2003:596). In our comment on Assumption (1) above, we
only touched upon the most probable mechanism, not how this happens. Why would the words used to describe options
change the reference point? A promising route is to appeal to the notion of information leakage as proposed by Sher and
McKenzie (2006, 2008, see also McKenzie and Nelson, 2003) and the subsequent development of their idea by Holleman
et al. (2009). Sher and McKenzie (2006, 2008) argue that the communicative frames evoked by the words used in a given
situation leak information. For instance, if a glass is described as now being half full, it is natural to infer that the glass was
empty before, in which case the reference point would be a-less-than half full glass or a completely empty glass. By
analogy, when it is said in the ADP that 200 people will be saved if a certain rescue program is implemented, it may be
inferred that nobody will be saved if the program is not implemented, with 600 people dead as the reference point. The
same reasoning could be used to argue that the reference point equals zero people dead when die is used because the
point of reference would be that it was inferred that they all survive. Sher and McKenzie (2008) claim that participants that
prefer Program A (the safe option) are more likely to frame this program as a gain, using saved. This indicates that
information leakage can occur in the ADP and that participants are sensitive to this aspect.
It should be noted that Sher and McKenzie (2006, 2008) have investigated information leakage mainly in relation to
attribute framing. This type of framing task involves the evaluation of a single option. In contrast, risky choice framing
involves several options where different risks are compared (for a taxonomy of framing tasks, see Levin et al., 1998).
Unfortunately, it is not a straightforward task to translate single-option-evaluation in attribute framing into several-option
risky choice framing. Holleman et al. (2009) also point out that the experiments carried out by Sher and McKenzie (2006)
do not take the communicative frame into account. Their proposal is instead an even more reflexive view based on how
inferences are made to bridge the gap between psychological states and linguistic choices. Nevertheless, the idea of
information leakage does provide us with a potential explanation for why evaluative polarity affects choices. We will come
back to this idea also in the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts of the ADP.
2.2. The Minimal-Gains-and-Losses Account
For the sake of our argument in Section 3, this section presents a highly simplified variant of the Gains-and-Losses
Account, in which words used to describe the options are allowed to directly determine whether the domain is gains or
losses. In accordance with this interpretation, any option described by saved is a gain, and any option described by die is a
loss. Consequently, the reference point has no influence on participants’ decisions. The Minimal-Gains-and-Losses
Account thus modifies Assumption (1) described in Fig. 1 into an Assumption (1M). Together with Assumption (3) it
explains the framing effect in the way depicted in Fig. 2.(1M) Fig. 2. 
accounThe evaluative polarity of words used to describe the options directly determines the domain of the options so
that positive evaluative polarity words set the domain to gains and words with a negative evaluative polarity set
the domain to losses.Assumption (1M) retains some of the features of Assumption (1), but it does not take negation into account, e.g. ‘not
saved’.
In Fig. 2 we see that the evaluative word meanings used to describe the options (1M) directly determine the domain,
and as a consequence also the participants’ risk seeking behavior (Assumption 3). The question then is why these words
have such a strong effect on participants’ choices. In order to answer that question, it seems reasonable to appeal to the
notion of information leakage, which should provide us with a mechanism for how evaluative words affect choices. Yet, it
does not help us understand the reasons for why evaluative polarity is effective. What is clear though is the importance ofThe flowchart summarizes the Minimal Gains-and-Losses Account of the framing effect (for details see text). The table illustrates how the
t works for Versions 1 (first row) and 2 (second row) of the ADP.
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negation nor communicative frames or differences in degrees of evaluative polarity have been discussed in the literature
(with some notable exceptions). This is what motivated us to develop the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts described in
Section 3 and discussed in Section 4.
3. The Evaluative-Polarity Accounts
In this section, we present our stepwise development of the Evaluative-Polarity Account of the ADP, starting with a
minimal version that is subsequently extended and elaborated into the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account and the
Extended- Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account. Through this, we aim to make headway toward a more linguistically
sophisticated approach to framing effects in the ADP, which focuses on the evaluative polarity of the words used to
describe the options. Section 3.1 offers some linguistics preliminaries. It discusses the notion of frame in relation to the
construal of opposition as expressed through die and saved in the different versions of the ADP. In Section 3.2, we
describe the increasingly more elaborate steps of our Evaluative-Polarity Account, starting with the minimal version of the
Evaluative-Polarity Account, which is similar to the Minimal-Gains-and-Losses Account, except for the fact that the latter
also allows reference points to influence choice. In the Minimal Evaluative-Polarity Account (Section 3.2), we do not take
negation into account at all, In Section 3.3, we present a more complex Evaluative-Polarity account, the Relative-
Evaluative-Polarity Account, and empirically test whether negation matters in the ADP. The outcome of Experiment 1
prompts further development of the Evaluative-Polarity Account, in which frames, in the linguistic sense, are taken into
account. This last step is the Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, which also allows for words to differ in their
evaluative polarity.
3.1. Frames and polarity
As has already been mentioned, it is our contention that there are two aspects of the ADP that have to be taken more
seriously to achieve a better understanding of the framing effect and the ADP. First, we have to acknowledge the role of
frames -- taken in their linguistic sense, which is broader than usually acknowledged in the decision making literature on
framing effects -- and second, we have to take negation, and how it influences evaluative polarity into account. The notion
of frame in linguistics is concerned with the organization of lexical concepts of different scenes. Frame Semantics is a
model of language use and understanding, within which encyclopedic knowledge, through the notion of frame, pervades
all aspects of language use. Human beings cannot understand meanings of words without access to all the essential
knowledge about the world and all essential knowledge of and about words and their use in different constructions,
different frames and different discourses (Fillmore, 2006; Paradis 2005, 2015).
Applied to the ADP, we identify three frames incorporated in one another: The presentation of the cover story itself, the
presentation of the rescue programs and the antonymic construction construals with die and saved. The most general
level is the frame of the cover story, which in the case of the ADP is a DISASTER frame. The description of the national-level
preparation of the handling of a serious disease evokes imminent danger, highlighted by lexical items such as outbreak,
unusual Asian disease, kill 600 people. The next level consists of the two versions of the RESCUE frame. The rescue
programs are contingent on the scene set through the cover story's DISASTER frame. Although the outcomes of the two
versions are identical; the ways in which they are presented differ. The differences are construed through the evaluative
polarity items, i.e. die and saved, with and without negation, with and without an explicit mention of the opposite pole. This
is the EXISTENCE frame, expressed through die--saved and through negation, such as in no people will be saved and no
people will die. The bipolar, antonymic EXISTENCE frame and the evaluative polarity of the words used to describe the
options are crucial for how the rescue programs are interpreted and assessed.
In contrast to the Gains-and-Losses and the Minimal-Gains-and-Losses Accounts, negation in the Evaluative-Polarity
Account cannot be ignored. It is well known that negation in text is not always used to reverse the truth of a proposition (e.g.
Tottie and Paradis, 1982; Tottie, 1991; Giora et al., 2005; Giora, 2006; Paradis and Willners, 2006, 2013; Giora et al., 2007,
2009, 2010; Horn, 2010). Instead it has important discursive functions. Negation can be used to emphasize a meaning
range along a dimension in contrast to another range along the same dimension. For instance, this is not good may be used
instead of this is bad, or this is not bad instead of this is good. Negation may also be used as an approximator or attenuator,
e.g. not strong may be used to attenuate the meaning of strong and instead evoke a meaning similar to fairly weak.
In our case, the negated contexts in the ADP are no people will be saved and nobody will die. In contrast to meanings
such as ‘bad’ and ‘good’, which are scalar, ‘saved’ and ‘die’ are absolute. They do not indicate ranges on an unbounded
scale, but are opposite properties on either side of a definite boundary, i.e. people either die or are saved (Paradis, 2001;
Paradis and Willners, 2011; Jones et al., 2012). This absolute, bounded, distinction between die and saved is important for
the equivalence between the first option of Version 1 and the first option of Version 2 of the ADP. Using judgment
experiments, Paradis and Willners (2006, 2013) show that bounded antonymic meanings are interpreted as opposites of
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opposite properties. No people saved in the context of the ADP means ‘all die’, and nobody will die means ‘all are saved’.
In the former, a positive word meaning, saved, is negated, while in the latter case a negative word meaning, die, is
negated. This fact may have mitigatory consequences.
Like us, Mandel (2014) questions the assumption of the ADP that language users’ understandings of options are
equivalent. While we question the assumption that the various different evaluative expressions with die and save are
interpreted in the same way, he raises another point that underlies the formulation of the ADP, namely that the numerical
expressions, ‘200’ and ‘1/3’, are in fact interpreted by people as completely equivalent values. He correctly points out that
in the linguistics literature on quantifiers there is general consensus that interpretations of numerical expressions are
sensitive to the contextual factors. It is not the case that numerical expressions are always understood as exact values. On
the contrary, it is well known that language users’ interpretations of quantifiers are predictably shaped by the context in
which they occur. Language users may interpret meanings of numerical expressions such as the ones used in ADP either
as ‘exactly’, ‘at least’ or ‘at most’ (e.g. Horn, 1989). Mandel argues that the participants, in fact, made linguistically rational
and predicable choices. Either they chose the option that maximized the outcome (‘lives saved’) or their choices were
consistent across the frames when the options were of equal value. Although there has been some debate as to the
validity of this conclusion (e.g. see Chick et al., 2016, and below), we agree that speakers’ understanding of natural
language use, irrespective of whether the expressions are numbers or words, has to be taken seriously.
It deserves to be pointed out that evaluative polarity has previously been discussed in connection with the framing effect.
For instance, Yamagishi (1996, 2002) discusses evaluative polarity as a measure of intrinsic pleasantness and shows that it
moderates certain aspects of the framing effect. Our concept of evaluative polarity also has to do with the pleasantness of
the whole decision problem. It is related to what is often called the frame (Kühberger, 1995) or descriptor frame (Mandel,
2001). There are also previous studies of the effects of evaluative polarity. For instance, Kessler et al. (1996) point out that
the value of an outcome is not only caused by gains or losses, but also by the value of the objects that could be gained or
lost. In their experiments, participants were asked whether they prefer the risky choice of 85% chance to gain 10 minutes of
pain, or a safe gain of 8 minutes of pain (Kessler et al., 1996:255). The majority of the participants chose the risky option. It is
worth noting, however, that evaluative polarity here refers to the objects of choice, not to the words used to describe the
options. Another example is Mandel (2001:64), who argues that there are two kinds of gains-and-losses descriptions, one of
which he refers to as the descriptor frame. In the ADP, the descriptor frame refers to the use of either saved or die. Thus the
descriptor frame of a problem determines what we refer to as the evaluative polarity of the problem. Mandel (2001:65) found
that when saved was used there was more risk aversion than when die was used. In this section, we present a series of
Evaluative-Polarity Accounts of the ADP in order to make a contribution to the important discussion in this field.
3.2. The Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account
The simplest way in which the evaluative polarity of words can influence participants’ behavior is by letting evaluative
polarity directly determine risk-seeking behavior as in the Minimal-Gains-and-Losses Account. For this reason, we start
our exposition of the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts with a Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account that allows the evaluative
polarity of the words used to describe the options to influence risk-seeking and risk aversion directly, at the same time as it
also allows the reference point to affect the choice. In order to arrive at a coherent account we cannot allow the reference
point to shift with the words used to describe options (in that case we would not need reference points). Instead the
Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account assumes one fixed reference point through all versions. We take the reference point
to be the cover story's expected outcome, i.e. 600 people dead in the original version of the ADP. This means that any
reference point will fit this model as long as it remains fixed.
One of the fundamentals of the Evaluative-Polarity Account is that it allows for the words used to describe the options to
define the evaluative polarity of the problem. In Version 1 of the ADP, for instance, the options are described by saved,
which evokes a bounded (definite), non-scalar, positive meaning. This version of the ADP thus has positive evaluative
polarity, i.e. the problem itself has positive evaluative polarity. Similarly, Version 2 of the ADP, where the options are
described in terms of die, evokes a bounded, non-scalar, negative meaning and the problem has negative evaluative
polarity. When a problem has positive evaluative polarity, people are expected to choose the safe option and are thus risk
averse, and vice versa for negative evaluative polarity. In this minimal version of the Evaluative-Polarity Account, we also
ignore negation. We return to the issue of negation in the versions of the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts described below.
The Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account is best described by adding two assumptions to Assumptions 2 and 3 of the
Gains-and-Losses Account.(4) The words used to describe the options define the evaluative polarity of the problem;
(5) The evaluative polarity of the problem influences the choice.
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Fig. 3. The flowchart summarizes the Evaluative Polarity Account of the framing effect. The reference point is assumed to be fixed at the ADP
cover story’s expected outcome (for details on Assumptions 2--5, see text). The table illustrates how the Evaluative Polarity Account works for
Versions 1 (first row) and 2 (second row) of the ADP. The arrow leading from evaluative polarity to choice is thicker than the arrow leading from
domain to choice in order to show that evaluative polarity has a stronger influence on choice than domain (gains-and-losses) in the account.The Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account in Fig. 3 differs from the Minimal-Gains-and-Losses account in Fig. 2 in that it
allows both reference points and the evaluative polarities to influence the choice. It differs from the Gains-and-Losses
Account in Fig. 1 in that decisions are influenced by both the domain of options (Assumption 3) and by the evaluative
polarity of the problem (Assumption 5). More specifically, in the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts, it is also hypothesized that
the effect of the evaluative polarity (Assumption 5) is stronger than the effect of the domain (Assumption 3), which is why
the arrow leading from evaluative polarity to choice is thicker than the arrow leading from domain to choice. This
hypothesis is necessary under the assumption of a fixed reference point, otherwise the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts
could not explain the results of the original ADP.
3.3. The Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account
In the first Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account, like in the Gains-and-Losses, and Minimal-Gains-and-Losses
Account, negation is ignored, i.e. 2/3 probability that no people will be saved in Version 1 and 1/3 probability that nobody
will die in Version 2. We have already pointed out that this is problematic since negated antonyms might not be completely
synonymous with their non-negated antonyms. We acknowledge the findings in Paradis and Willners (2006, 2013) that
negated bounded antonymic meanings, such as dead and alive, are indeed interpreted as synonyms of their negated
counterparts, i.e. not dead is interpreted in the same way as alive and vice versa. Like them, we also make use of negated
and non-negated antonyms, but, there is a difference between their work and ours in that their experiments are judgement
experiments that tap into the interpretations of antonymic words in isolation. In our study, the stimuli are presented in a
very specific context and the negated and non-negated antonymic constructions are examined in relation to one another
as well as to an evaluative scale ranging from negative to positive.
In the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account we introduce the evaluative polarity of an option. This account thus
deviates from Assumptions (4) and (5) of the first Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account. According to Assumption (4), the
evaluative polarity of Version 1 of the ADP is positive because the meaning of saved is positive. This raises the question of
whether the evaluative polarity of both the options of this problem is positive. We argue that the evaluative polarity is
positive for the safe option, i.e. 200 people are saved, but not for the risky option, i.e. 1/3 probability that 600 people will be
saved and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. The risky option has mixed evaluative polarity. It is described by
saved, which evokes a positive meaning, and by the expression no people saved, which evokes a negative meaning in
spite of the fact that the positive word saved is used. The idea that an option may be associated with evaluative polarity is
related to what Kühberger calls a frame (1995:231, Table 1). According to him, the frame of the safe option is positive,
while the frame of the risky option is mixed since it contains expressions with negation, e.g. no people saved. Note that the
Relative Evaluative-Polarity Account is very similar to Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna and Brainerd, 1991; Kühberger and
Tanner, 2010; Chick et al., 2016; Reyna et al., 2014). Here, the notion of ‘gist’ is used to capture that participants do not
attend to the full information available, but instead focus on the lowest level representation. In this case, this involves
saving some lives for certain or saving some or no lives with a probability (Chick et al., 2016:240). According to Fuzzy
Trace Theory, participants, in the positive version of the ADP are said to choose between saving some lives and for the
risky option between saving some or none. We want to point out that although Fuzzy Trace Theory acknowledges the
importance of negation, it does not expand on the evaluative polarity of options. It can therefore not accommodate the
Extended Relative Evaluative Polarity account, which we present in Section 3.4. Mandel (2001:64, Table 3) also uses the
term outcome frame to refer to the meaning of expressions that include negation, such as no people saved. He does not,
however, consider decision options with mixed evaluative polarity. This factor, however, is of vital importance for our
understanding of the connection to the meaning of the evaluative polarity words in the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity
Account.
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Table 1
A summary of the predictions of the Relative Evaluative Polarity Account (see Fig. 4). See text for descriptions of the ADP cover story and of the
ADP Versions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Range of
outcomes








0 dead 200 saved
(Version 1)
Positive 1/3 that 600 saved and
2/3 that 0 saved
(Version 1)
Mixed Safe option
200 saved and 400 not saved
(Version 3)





Negative 1/3 that 0 die and
2/3 that 600 die
(Version 2)
Mixed Risky option
400 die and 200 not die
(Version 4)
Mixed 2/3 that 600 die
(Version 4)
Negative Safe option




has aThe words used to describe the options define the evaluative polarity of the options;
(7) The relative evaluative polarity of the options influences the choice.Assumption (7) states that participants choose an option with positive evaluative polarity rather than an option with
mixed evaluative polarity and an option with mixed evaluative polarity rather than an option with negative evaluative
polarity. We have replaced Assumption (4) and Assumption (5) with (6) and (7) respectively. The Relative-Evaluative-
Polarity Account of the framing effect with a fixed reference point is shown in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4 we see that the words used to describe the options (Assumption 6) affect the evaluative polarity of the options
(Assumption 7) and that this influences choice to a higher degree than the domain of the options (Assumption 3, given by
the reference point, Assumption 2). The Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account allows negation to influence participants’
behavior in the ADP, whereas the Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account does not. The Relative-Evaluative Polarity
Account predicts that the relative evaluative polarity of the option will exert stronger effects on participants’ risk seeking
behavior than the evaluative polarity of the problem. The Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts the opposite since
it ignores negation. The hypothesis of relative evaluative polarity is given in (H1).
H1. The relative evaluative polarity of the option, i.e. that the safe option has higher evaluative polarity or the risky option
has higher evaluative polarity, has stronger influence on the choice than the evaluative polarity of the problem, i.e. the
positive or the negative meaning of the words.
It is important to note that neither Gains-and-Losses nor Minimal Gains-and-Losses make any predictions to this effect,
although it could, perhaps, be argued that the Minimal-Gains-and-Losses Account should make the same prediction as
the Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account. This is because Prospect theory and our two derivative models of Prospect
theory ignore linguistic aspects of the framing effect. Note also that a similar prediction to H1 can be derived from Fuzzy
Trace Theory, but again since this theory is mute on the evaluative polarity of the options, it cannot move beyond negation
in its explanation of the framing effect.
3.3.1. Experiment 1
3.3.1.1. Procedure, participants and design. All in all, 259 participants (average age = 22.6 years; standard
deviation = 4.8 years) participated in Experiment 1. They were undergraduate students of philosophy and computer. A summary of the Relative Evaluative Polarity Account of the framing effect with a fixed reference point (for details on 2, 3, 6, and 7, see
 This account differs from Evaluative Polarity Account (Fig. 3) in that it specifies how the evaluative polarity of individual options -- rather than
valuative polarity of the whole problem -- influences choice. The arrow leading from relative evaluative polarity to choice is drawn thicker than
rrow leading from domain to choice in order to show that in the Relative Evaluative Polarity Account the relative evaluative polarity of options
 stronger influence on choice than domain.
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people dead. After reading the story, the participants of each of the four groups were asked to choose between Programs
A and B, described in different words in the four versions given below. Within each version the order of presentation of the
programs was counterbalanced.
Two of the problems tested were the original Versions 1 and 2 of the ADP described in the introduction. The other two
were new problems, namely Versions 3 and 4 described below. In Version 1 of the original ADP, as Kühberger (1995)
points out, the safe option, 200 people will be saved, is not fully described as it is not explicitly stated what will happen to
the remaining 400 people. Is it the case that they will die or is it the case that they will never completely recover from the
disease? On the other hand, the risky option is described in full in the sense that it is explicitly stated that there is 1/3
probability that everyone will be saved and there is 2/3 probability that everyone will die. Version 3 is a variant of Version 1.
It has been changed so that the safe option is fully described, while the risky option is not. Similarly, Version 4 was
obtained by changing Version 2 of the original ADP so that the safe option is fully described and the risky option is not:
Version 3
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved.Fi
po
baVersion 4
 If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die and 200 people will not die.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.Like the Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account, the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts that the safe option will be
chosen in Version 1 and the risky option will be chosen in Version 2. For Versions 3 and 4, however, the predictions of the
Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account are different from the predictions of the Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account. In
Version 3 first, the safe option has mixed evaluative polarity and the risky option has positive evaluative polarity. Thus the
Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts that the risky option will be chosen. The account based on the Minimal-
Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts that the safe option will be chosen. In Version 4, the safe option has mixed evaluative
polarity and the risky option has negative evaluative polarity. The Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts that the
safe option will be chosen, while the Minimal-Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts that the risky option will be chosen.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account for the four versions.
Table 1 shows that our design has two factors: The evaluative polarity of problem and the relative evaluative polarity of
option. The evaluative polarity of the problem has two levels: It is positive when the word used is saved and negative when
word used is die. The relative evaluative polarity also has two levels that indicate which option has the higher evaluative
polarity: The safe option or risky option.
3.3.1.2. Results. The results are shown in Fig. 5. In Version 1, 39% of the participants chose the risky option and in
Version 2, 67% of the participants chose the risky option. This replicates the results in the original ADP and is consistentg. 5. Experiment 1: The influence of the relative evaluative polarity of the options on the choice is stronger than the influence of the evaluative
larity of the problem. Gray bars represent Versions where the relative evaluative polarity is higher for the safe option (Versions 1 and 3). Black
rs represent Versions where the relative evaluative polarity is higher for the risky option (Versions 2 and 4).
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Table 2
A summary of the logistic regression results for the contrasts between Versions 1--3 and 2--4 (the Relative Evaluative Polarity Account predicts
differences) and between Versions 2--3 and 1--4 (the Minimal Evaluative Polarity Account predicts differences).
Contrast Coefficients Standard errors Z-values P-values
Version 1--Version 3 1.76 0.39 4.49 <0.0001
Version 2--Version 4 0.47 0.37 1.28 0.20
Version 2--Version 3 0.64 0.40 1.59 0.11
Version 1--Version 4 0.65 0.36 1.83 0.07with all accounts in Figs. 1, 2 and 4.2 In Version 3, 79% of the participants chose the risky option, while in Version 4, 56% of
the participants chose the risky option. Thus the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account was partly supported.
We performed a logistic regression analysis, and contrast-coded the four versions, so that the estimates of the analysis
represented the contrasts between Version 1 and 3, and between Version 2 and 4, which are the contrasts relevant for the
Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, and then once more between Version 2 and 3; and between Version 1 and 4, which
are the contrasts relevant for the Evaluative-Polarity Accounts. Table 2 shows the coefficients, standard errors, z-values
and p-values for each contrast, i.e. between Version 1 and 3, Version 2 and 4, and between Version 2 and 3; Version 1 and
4. The contrast between Versions 1 and 3, which is relevant for the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, is significant at
p < 0.0001. The one between Versions 1 and 4, which is relevant for evaluative polarity, has a p = 0.07. Neither of the two
contrasts including Version 2 is significant. Hypothesis (H1) is therefore only partly supported.
3.3.1.3. Discussion. The relative evaluative polarity of the options affects people's decisions in this extended ADP. The
influence of relative polarity of the options is in some cases stronger than that of the evaluative polarity of the problem, but
not always. When options are described using the word save, i.e. positive evaluative polarity words, negation appears to
matter in the way proposed by the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account. The importance of negation has also been shown
in previous research, in particular by Kühberger (1995). However, we observe a differential effect of relative-option-
evaluative polarity for Versions 3 and 4. We will return to this below, and in the Extended-Evaluative-Polarity Account,
because the differential effect appears to be best explained by differences in how negation affects the evaluative polarity
of options.
It deserves to be mentioned that there are some problems with the interpretation of Experiment 1. In particular,
Program B of Version 3, 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved, and Version 4, 2/3 probability that 600 die, are only
equivalent if we assume that a statement saying that a certain proportion of the inhabitants are saved or die entails that the
rest are not saved or will not die. If participants instead interpret the statement so that the un-mentioned proportion is ‘not-
all saved’, the outcomes of Version 3 and 4 will differ. To some extent the same criticism applies to Program A in Versions
1 and 2 of the original ADP too, where it is not explicitly stated what happens to the individuals that are not saved, or do not
die (cf. Mandel, 2014). It is, however, possible to argue that the contrast is clearer when probabilities are not included. It is
difficult to control for this factor, since a further specification of Program B would lead to a change in the relative evaluative
polarity of the problem. When Chick et al. (2016) disambiguated the interpretation in the ADP and variants of it, using
either lives or monetary outcomes, the framing effect remained robust. The participants received disambiguating
instructions prior to responding to the various framing problems, for instance ‘‘. . . if we specify that there is a probability
that everyone will be saved, if that does not happen, no one will be saved. Similarly, if we specify that there is a probability
that no one will be saved, if that does not happen, everyone will be saved’’ (ibid: 254). An interesting extension for further
research would be to examine the evaluative interpretation of the probability statements in themselves, perhaps in the
manner indicated by Fuzzy Trace Theory. Potentially statements such as ‘1/3 probability’ may give rise to evaluative
polarity in themselves.
Note also that Kühberger (1995) presented participants with fully specified versions of the outcomes for both the risky
and the safe options so that Program A, for instance, was described in full as 200 will be saved and 600 will not be saved,
and as Program B is in the original Version 1 of the ADP 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved and 2/3 probability that no
people will be saved. With this description, 62% of the participants in Kühberger's Experiment 1 are risk seeking in the
version using positive evaluative polarity words, and for the equivalent, but negative, 57% are risk seeking. Kühberger's
replication of the standard ADP yielded a clear (but not as strong as in the original experiments) framing effect with 48% of2 It also confirms that the Swedish participants, responding to an English version of the ADP, behave in the same way as the native speakers
did. There is no major distortion of the results due to the language used in the experimental trials, but see Oganian et al. (2016), for a detailed
discussion of language switching and the framing effect.
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version with negative evaluative polarity words. The fact that the framing effect disappears when options are fully
described, i.e. when all information is explicitly mentioned in the text, suggests that the evaluative polarity of the words
used to describe the options are very important for participants’ choices, and, in our opinion, it gives credibility to our
interpretation of Versions 3 and 4.
Chick et al. (2016) also used a truncated versions of the ADP, but with only one of the risky options specified, i.e. ‘‘2/3
probability no one saved’’ and ‘‘1/3 probability 600 saved’’ respectively. They did not, however, fully specify the safe
options as in Experiment 1, but rather removed parts of the information. In the case specified above, Fuzzy Trace Theory
would predict an increased framing effect since the gist of the options is that it is certain that some people were saved
compared to none were saved, and the attraction of the safe option is thus higher than in the original ADP where
participants were asked to choose between that it is certain that some people were saved and some or none were saved.
The Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account makes the same prediction. The truncated versions of Chick, Reyna and
Corbin, support both theories, as do the results of the positive evaluative polarity versions of ADP in Experiment 1. Note,
however, that Fuzzy Trace Theory uses a different mechanism to make these predictions, namely memory traces rather
than evaluative polarity. As we will see below, evaluative polarity allows us to post hoc explain the differential outcomes of
the positive and negative evaluative polarity options (e.g. save vs. die).
In the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account and in Experiment 1, the evaluative polarity of an option is determined by
a simple algebra on the basis of the evaluative polarity evoked by the words used to describe the options, i.e. the
evaluative polarity of the antonyms with and without negation. This is what leads to the similarity to Fuzzy Trace Theory.
For example, the evaluative polarity of the option 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved is assumed to
equal the value of saved plus the evaluative polarity of NEGATOR + saved. This assumption has received experimental
support showing that the participants’ interpretations of bounded antonymic meanings are interpreted as one another's
absolute opposites, i.e. die is interpreted as a synonym of not alive and not alive as a synonym of die (Paradis and
Willners, 2006, 2013). Now, it goes without saying that the algebra is a simplification. First, it implies that the number of
the people that will be saved or that will die is irrelevant, which is a very strong assumption. A second implication is that
the sum of the evaluative polarity of a word and of the value of its negation is constant across words. For example, the
evaluative polarity of the option 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved is assumed to equal the
evaluative polarity of the option 400 people will die and 200 people will not die -- both have mixed evaluative polarity (see
Table 1). It seems to be the case that this is not true because, if it were true, we would not have observed a differential
effect of the relative-option-evaluative polarity for the evaluative polarity conditions of Versions 3 and 4. The effect of the
relative evaluative polarity of the problem is significant when the problem evaluative polarity is positive but not when it is
negative. This result can be explained on the basis of the assumption that the value of NEGATOR + die is smaller than the
absolute value of NEGATOR + saved. In order to make sure that this is the case, we asked 124 undergraduates at Lund
University to rate the two words in terms of their pleasantness on a scale from 5 to +5. The average rating of not die was
+0.7, while the average rating of not be saved was 2.8. The words were embedded in a list of 14 near synonyms such as
survive and lose one's life and the order of the words was counterbalanced across the participants. According to a t-test,
the difference between the absolute values was significant at the 0.001 level. This seems reasonable since not be saved
implies that someone missed the chance of being saved -- a clearly unpleasant outcome -- while not die is a description of
survival, in which case the implication is that status quo is retained. Note that this explanation is not available in Fuzzy
Trace Theory.
A slightly different version of the algebraic model is also used in the work of Kühberger (1995:231, Table 1). In his work,
the algebra is applied to the frame describing the options and not to the evaluative polarity of an option. Thus, the option,
200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved, has a mixed evaluative polarity in our study whereas for
Kühberger (1995), it has a mixed frame. It may be argued that, in the end, the concepts of evaluative polarity, gist, and
frame have similar theoretical functions. One difference that may be important for future theorizing is that frames have not
been related to ‘intrinsic pleasantness’, whereas evaluative polarity has (Yamagishi, 2002). This is an important
theoretical difference since Kühberger's and Fuzzy Trace Theory's focus is on whether the options are fully described or
not, i.e. whether and how they are specified, and what will happen to those that do not die or are not saved. This account
cannot accommodate possible variation in the values of each evaluative word such as not saved vs. die. Therefore,
Kühberger cannot explain the differences between Versions 3 and 4 in the way that we can through our Relative-
Evaluative-Polarity Account.
3.4. The Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account
The Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account uses an algebraic model that can take value differences in
evaluative polarity into account. If participants directly respond to the valence, i.e. ‘the intrinsic pleasantness’, of the words
used to describe the options (so far only saved and die vs. not saved and not die), the degree of evaluative polarity could
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The difference between Version 3 and Version 4 above is a case in point. In order to investigate this possibility, we
propose a tentative Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, which adds the valence, where valence is the degree
of evaluative polarity of each option. The Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account predicts that the tendency to be
risk seeking or risk averse is influenced by this graded valence. In this way, we can begin to address the effect that
variation in valence has on the ADP.
In order to formulate the Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, we need to specify how the valence of the
options is computed. We take the original version of the ADP as an example. The words that are of importance for the
evaluative polarity algebraic model are in italics.
Version 1
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be
saved.
Version 2
 If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.There are two things that have to be captured by the algebraic model. First, we need to retain the predictions of the
Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, so that, in general, an option with positive evaluative polarity is chosen over one
with mixed evaluative polarity, which in turn should be preferred to options with negative evaluative polarity. Second, we
need to take the valence of the evaluative polarity words into account, and in particular the difference in valence between
positive and negative evaluative polarity words that appear in the same option, such as Program B in the two versions
above. In general, the larger the distance between the two evaluative polarity expressions, i.e. the distance between
saved--NEGATOR + saved, and die--NEGATOR + die, the more contrastive strength the mixed option will have, in comparison
to an unqualified, positive or negative evaluative polarity option. Both saved and not saved and die and not die are
absolutive opposites. Even though intermediate interpretations can be constructed, they may not be the most natural as is
the case for meanings of expressions such as good and not good, or bad and not bad (Paradis, 2001; Paradis and
Willners, 2006, 2013).
In addition, the algebra will have to account for versions of the ADP, where the fully specified options are those for
Program A instead of for Program B in Experiment 1.
Version 3
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved.Version 4
 If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die and 200 people will not die.
 If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.For the Extended Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, we therefore propose an algebraic model in two steps.
First, the plus or minus sign for the difference in evaluative polarity between Program A and B is calculated based on
the evaluative polarity of the programs with fully specified options and the distance between the evaluative polarity of
the wordings. The mathematical sign is then used to predict which option participants will be most likely to choose. For
Version 1, we determine the sign by taking the evaluative polarity of saved and subtract the distance between the
evaluative polarity of saved and the evaluative polarity of NEGATOR + saved. For Version 2, it is obtained by taking the
evaluative polarity of die and subtracting the distance between the evaluative polarity of die and the evaluative polarity
of NEGATOR + die. For Version 3, instead, the sign is determined by taking the distance between the evaluative polarity
of saved and the evaluative polarity of NEGATOR + saved and subtracting the evaluative polarity of saved, and, finally, for
Version 4, the distance between the evaluative polarity of die and the evaluative polarity of NEGATOR + die and
subtracting the evaluative polarity of die. Most likely, the sign will be positive for Program A in Version 1 and 4; hence
we predict that the participants will choose this option. The sign for Program B in Version 2 and 3 will likely be negative;
hence the participants will choose Program B. The second step of the model is achieved by using the distance between
the words used to describe the option (save--NEGATOR + save, and die--NEGATOR + die) to determine the strength of the
prediction. In this way, a participant with a large distance between the negated and non-negated option will most likely
choose the program with a positive sign, because it will be the clearest positive outcome given that it has a larger
numerical distance.
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In analogy with Hypothesis (H1), we state:
H2. The sign for the different options together with the distance between the evaluative polarity words used to describe
options, i.e. the word and its negated variant, determines the degree of risk seeking, so that the option with a positive sign
is more likely to be chosen the larger the distance between the evaluative polarity words used is.
3.4.1.1. Procedure, participants and design. All in all, 732 participants (average age = 22.9 years; standard
deviation = 2.96 years) participated in Experiment 2. They were undergraduate students of social sciences, humanities
and law at Lund University, all fluent in English
We constructed 12 different versions of the ADP using synonyms for the expressions used to describe the options of
the opposite pairs: gained--lost, survived--killed and lengthened--shortened together with their negated variants. In the
descriptions of the ADP problem, all the stimuli express evaluative polarity. Two of them are bounded, either-or antonym
pairs and so are their negated variants, i.e. either lives were lost or not, either lives were gained or not, etc. One pair,
lengthen--shorten, is gradable in the sense that lives can be shortened or lengthened, but the extent of the shortening or
lengthening may be applied differently by different people. This word pair was included to also capture the effect of
scalable meanings with opposite evaluative meanings. We used many versions in order to ensure sufficient variability in
evaluative polarity. Each expression was used in two versions of the ADP; the original type where Program B is fully
specified (as in Version 1 and 2 above), and the modified type where, instead, Program A is fully specified (as in Version 3
and 4 above). All versions can be found in Table 4, together with the assessments to each version by the participants.
After having responded to one particular version of the ADP (that is, only one out of the in total 12 possible versions),
each participant was asked to rate the intrinsic pleasantness of each stimulus word and its negated variant on a scale from
1 to 11. The order of expressions was counterbalanced, and each participant responded to the ADP first, before rating the
expression. (Note that we used 200 for all numerical expressions so that participants would focus on the valence of the
word rather than the number). The mean valence of each expression is given in Table 3, which shows that there are clear
differences between positive and negative statements, but, as expected, the magnitude differs across the stimulus pairs.
In order to be able to predict an outcome for the different versions of the ADP using the proposed algebra for the
Extended Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account, there has to be a difference between the evaluative polarity of Program A
and B. For 17 of our participants this was not the case, and these were excluded from further analysis. Eleven additional
participants were excluded for not having rated the words used in their particular version of the ADP. This left us with 704
participants all in all. For most ADPs, the sign of the difference between Programs A and B coincided with how the options
would be characterized by the Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account. Participants who did not display the differences
predicted by Relative-Evaluative-Polarity were kept in the analysis. For the exact number of answers in the expected
direction see Table 4. An analysis was performed for all individual participants and his or her individual rating of the
stimulus expression, so that the evaluative polarities used to predict the likelihood of risk seeking behavior were unique for
each participant.
3.4.1.2. Results. We performed a logistic regression analysis using the sign for the scenario (with a positive sign
predicting risk averse and a negative sign predicting risk seeking behavior) and the distance between the expression used
in the ADP and its negation as predictors. Table 5 displays the coefficients, standard errors, z-values and p-values for
each. In particular we note that a larger distance in evaluative polarity between the negated and non-negated expressions,
together with a positive sign predicts a lower number of risk seeking participants: 0.14 ( p < 0.01). In Fig. 6, we chart
participants with positive and negative signs and display how their likelihood of being risk seeking varies with the distance
in evaluative polarity.
These results concern all versions of the ADP, i.e. 1--12. It might make sense also to zoom in on versions of the ADP
that lie close to the original, and in which only the evaluative polarity words have been varied, that is the versions in whichTable 3
The mean valence (SE) of the expressions used in Experiment 2.
Expression Mean valence (SE) Negated expression Mean valence (SE)
200 people will survive 9,91 (1.31) 200 people will not survive 2.34 (1.40)
200 people will be killed 1.46 (0.74) 200 people will not be killed 8.14 (2.07)
200 lives will be gained 8.66 (1.71) 200 lives will not be gained 4.04 (1.64)
200 lives will be lost 2.33 (1.37) 200 lives will not be lost 8.07 (1.78)
200 people’s lives will be lengthened 8.57 (1.50) 200 peoples’ lives will not be lengthened 3.97 (1.63)
200 people’s lives will be shortened 3.13 (1.38) 200 people’s lives will not be shortened 7.60 (1.84)
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Table 4
The versions of the ADP used in Experiment 2 together with the number of participants that choose each option (in parenthesis).
Version No. participants
choosing option
Version 1 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will survive. 37
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will survive, and 2/3 probability that no people
will survive.
25
Version 2 If Program A is adopted, 400 people will be killed. 15
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will be killed, and 2/3 probability that 600 people
will be killed.
47
Version 3 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will survive and 400 people will not survive. 25
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will survive. 29
Version 4 If Program A is adopted, 400 people will be killed and 200 people will not be killed. 31
If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probabilities that 600 people will be killed. 28
Version 5 If Program A is adopted, 200 lives will be gained. 44
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 lives will be gained, and 2/3 probability that no lives
will be gained.
17
Version 6 If Program A is adopted, 400 lives will be lost. 15
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that no lives will be lost, and 2/3 probability that 600 lives will
be lost.
47
Version 7 If Program A is adopted, 200 lives will be gained and 400 lives will not be gained. 26
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 lives will be gained. 35
Version 8 If Program A is adopted, 400 lives will be lost and 200 lives will not be lost. 41
If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probabilities that 600 lives will be lost. 17
Version 9 If Program A is adopted, 200 lives will be lengthened. 32
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 lives will be lengthened, and 2/3 probability that no
lives will be lengthened
28
Version 10 If Program A is adopted, 400 lives will be shortened. 25
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that no lives will be shortened, and 2/3 probability that 600
lives will be shortened.
38
Version 11 If Program A is adopted, 200 lives will be lengthened and 400 lives will not be lengthened. 25
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 lives will be lengthened. 42
Version 12 If Program A is adopted, 400 lives will be shortened and 200 lives will not be shortened. 29
If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probability that 600 lives will be shortened. 34only Program B is fully specified. For this half of our participants we see an effect of distance in evaluative polarity between
negated and non-negated expressions for versions with a positive sign, in this case, mostly versions where options are
described using positively valenced evaluative polarity words such as survive, gain and lengthened (estimate 1.02,
SE = 0.52, p = 0.005), but not for versions with a negative sign (estimate 0.45, SE = 0.35, p = 0.20).
3.5. Discussion
Generally speaking, it seems to be the case that the distance between the evaluative polarity word used to describe the
option and its negation can be used to predict the likelihood that a participant will be risk seeking, or risk averse, depending
on the plus or the minus sign. The results appear to be sensitive to the type of evaluative polarity words that are used to
describe the options, however. When we zoom in on ADPs with a traditional setup (in which only Program B is fully
specified), we see that the effect only remains for (mostly) positively valenced evaluative polarity words.
This sensitivity might be because the differences across participants’ assessments of the test items in the ADP are
limited. The meanings of our test items are bounded, non-scalar meanings, such as ‘saved’, ‘die’ and so are their negatedTable 5
A summary of the logistic regression results when risk seeking is predicted using the sign (positive or negative) and the distance between the
positive and negative evaluative polarity words used to describe the option.
Estimate Standard errors Z-values P-values
Intercept 0.16 0.25 0.64 0.52
Sign 0.15 0.35 0.43 0.67
Distance 0.10 0.04 2.76 0.006
Sign * Distance 0.14 0.05 2.64 0.008
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Fig. 6. The probability of risk seeking responses given distance in evaluative polarity between the negated and non-negated expressions used to
describe the options (e.g. saved--NEGATOR + saved) for participants with a negative sign for the difference between options (left, risk seeking
predicted) and a positive sign (right, risk aversion predicted) respectively.versions. In fact, as has been mentioned before, when the participants were asked where on a scale they locate the
meanings of dead and alive, they indicate that they occupy the position at the very ends of a given scale, close to the
extreme boundaries. An interesting finding was that the positive results are stronger for the positive versions of the ADP
than for the negative ones in both experiments (see Figs. 5 and 6). This is an intriguing finding, which we return in the
Section 4, where we also compare and discuss other researchers’ findings in relation to ours.
4. General discussion
The framing effect has been extensively studied in the literature. Due to both its theoretical and practical importance
this is not surprising. It is theoretically important because it challenges the foundations of the dominant normative decision
theory, one of the core assumptions of which is that choices are invariant, i.e. decision makers do not respond differently to
options with identical outcomes. When this happens -- as in the framing effect -- the consequences are potentially dire. As
mentioned in the introduction, the practical implications of the framing effect are perhaps even more important since it is
known to affect people's behavior in real world decisions in different areas ranging from medicine to finance. In spite of
these important and concrete applications, there is at present no theory that can explain why and when the effect occurs,
as noted by Maule and Villejoubert (2007:25). We have approached the framing effect, as it occurs in risky choice, in a
cross-disciplinary study combining insights from philosophy and psychology with research in linguistics. Our goal has
been to provide an alternative explanation for the ADP, which does not rest on concepts such as domain (gains or losses).
Instead, we have focused on the evaluative polarity of the words used to describe the decision options. The hypotheses
tested were that (i) the words used to describe the options define the evaluative polarity of the problem, and (ii) the
evaluative polarity of the problem (positive or negative) influences the choice. Both of them were borne out to some extent.
We developed a tentative model for how the evaluative polarity of options, as opposed to the domain of the problems,
affects decision makers (Fig. 4). This model does not only focus on whether the words used to describe the problem have
positive or negative evaluative polarity (saved or die) but also on the presence of negation in the description of the options.
This is similar to variants of Fuzzy Trace Theory (e.g. Reyna and Brainerd, 1991; Kühberger and Tanner, 2010; Chick
et al., 2016; Reyna et al., 2014). Experiment 1 shows that the relative evaluative polarity of the option in the decision
problem, determined by the evaluative meaning of the words used to describe the options and their negated expressions,
has a stronger impact on participants’ behavior than the evaluative polarity of the problem, at least for the Versions using
positive evaluative polarity words. In contrast to Fuzzy Trace Theory, we argue that it is the words that are used to describe
the options that define the evaluative polarity of the problem, and that the evaluative polarity of the problem (positive or
negative) influences the choice. In the ADP, the options occur in the context of a cover story profiled against the DISASTER
frame. This frame is kept constant and is the point of departure from which all choices are made, and the backdrop against
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participants. More precisely, we vary the way in which the options are presented, i.e. with and without negation, with
numerals or vulgar fractions and the ordering of these (see Mandel, 2014 for a more precise approach to the numeric
expressions, though). The fact that people actually interpret saved and die as non-scalar is crucial for the experiment
since we are proposing a model based on an either-or understanding of the antonyms. In addition, when options were
described with the positive descriptor saved, negated and non-negated, participants chose the risky option, as predicted if
purely positive frames are preferred to mixed frames, i.e. that participants simply rely on the evaluative polarity of saved in
order to assess the options. Contrary to our expectations, the same was not true for options described with the negative
descriptor. As we have pointed out before, this may be due to the fact that there is a magnitude discrepancy in the
descriptors’ evaluative polarity. NEGATOR + saved is felt to be more negative than NEGATOR + die is positive. For instance,
along the evaluative scale NEGATOR + die may be a good thing (‘saved’) or a very bad thing ‘very badly injured’, while
NEGATOR + saved is likely to be straightforwardly understood as a bad thing (‘die’).
These findings and the linguistic approach to relative evaluative polarity allowed us to develop the account into the
Extended-Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account. In this, final account, the distance in evaluative polarity between negated
and non-negated expressions used to describe options was used to predict the likelihood that participants will be risk
averse or risk seeking. This was tested in Experiment 2 where we also varied the degree of evaluative polarity evoked by
the two bounded, non-scalar, antonymic expressions, saved and die, by using versions of them. Experiment 2
demonstrated that differences in evaluative polarity also led to different degrees of risk preference. Participants do in fact
respond to the evaluative polarity of the words used to describe the options. Therefore, it is not only the positive or
negative gist of the expression as Fuzzy Trace Theory would have it, but also the evaluative polarity (how positive or
negative that gist is) that affects risk seeking in the framing effect. We believe that the Extended-Evaluative-Polarity
Account can act as an important complement to Fuzzy Trace Theory, and agree with Mandel that natural language
interpretations of the framing effect must be taken seriously in the design and analysis of experimental data.
As we have noted, it is interesting that both Experiment 1 and 2 provided stronger effects for versions using mainly
positive evaluative polarity words than for versions using mainly negative evaluative polarity words (see Figs. 5 and 6).
This ties in with Kühberger's and Gradl's (2013) finding that framing only influences the safe option, i.e. Program A. They
observed, as did Peters and Levin (2008), that when participants were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of the different
programs, the Versions produced clear differences in attractiveness, so that Program A was considered more attractive in
Version 1 than in Version 2, but, unexpectedly, this did not hold for Program B. At this point in time, we have no explanation
for this. It is an issue that deserves to be looked into more closely in future studies.
Words have emotional effects and these may, to some extent, be measured numerically (e.g. Bradley and Lang, 1999).
Our account makes use of a simple algebraic model over the space of word values. This algebraic model is similar to
Anderson's (1981) information integration theory but with weaker assumptions. Indeed, we did found that the distance in
evaluative polarity between positive and negative verbal expressions and their negations (NEGATOR + die) to some extent
can be used to predict the probability of participants’ risk seeking behavior (for negative differences) and risk averse
behavior (for positive differences) respectively. This can be seen as a form of ‘‘loss aversion’’ (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) in the space of word values but not in the space of outcomes. We doubt that the experimental method used in
Experiment 2 can be further extended, however. As we have already stated, there is not much room for stretching the
meanings of words related to death and life, since they are bounded, either-or, meanings, for which there is not much room
for subjective interpretations along dimension of more and less, as would have been the case, had we used words such as
short and long (Paradis, 2001; Paradis and Willners, 2006). There is yet another potentially more powerful problem
involved, which concerns the very wording of the options of the cover story in ADP viewed in terms of experimental design.
This problem has to do with consistency across the alternatives (see Kühberger and Gradl, 2013, for a related point).
In Version 1, the expressions are saved and no people will be saved, while in Version 2 they are die and nobody will die.
The discrepancy across the two versions in terms of the expressions is of course not an ideal ground for an experimental
design, nor is the fact that one of the word meanings presupposes some kind of agentive intrusion (saved), while the other
does not (die). Now, the main goal of the present study was to replicate Tversky's and Kahneman's (1981) experiment in
order to evaluate the participants’ inclinations to select the risky or the safe option, assuming that it is not the reference
point that is crucial for the participants’ decisions but the evaluative polarity of the words. For this study to be a replication
of the original ADP, we had to keep their formulations of the different versions of the cover story intact. However, in future
research it would clearly be interesting to work out a linguistically controlled design of the formulation of the different
version.
An interesting continuation of this research would be to see to what extent our observations generalize to other types of
framing, such as attribute framing, in which case, evaluative polarity will not be related to how risk seeking participants are,
but rather, for instance, to what extent they trust information given. Hilbig (2009) demonstrated that participants are more
likely to judge a statement, such as ‘‘the percentage of successfully completed instances of attempted rapes’’, as being
more trustworthy than those given the statement ‘‘the percentage of attempted but unsuccessful rapes’’. Could the extent
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words in each description, as in our Relative-Evaluative-Polarity Account?
A remaining problem in this line of research is why evaluative polarity should matter more to decision makers than the
domain of the options. At least two possible explanations can be given, one concerning the structure of the decision task,
and one concerning the role of emotions in decision making. Firstly, while it may be difficult to assess which domain an
option belongs to, the triggering effect of the evaluative polarity of the words used to describe each option may be the
solution to this problem. It is well known that decision makers are more strongly influenced by easily evaluated aspects
than they are of less easily evaluated aspects (Hsee and Zhang, 2010) and by mechanisms related to the expectations in
actual communicative situations. Secondly, the evaluative polarity of the words used to describe the options can also
directly affect how pleasant each option is deemed to be. In real life, pleasantness, or lack thereof, may very well be
excellent cues to whether we are dealing with potentially threatening situations, involving losses, or situations that are
safe, involving gains. The strong link between decision making and emotional responses is well documented, which is
very important since, otherwise, it would not be possible to evaluate the utility of the options in the choice situation. For
instance, Simon (1983) states that if we set out to explain human rationality we have to take the role of emotions in choice
behavior seriously. This link has been discussed in various fields such as in the risk-as-feelings literature (e.g.
Loewenstein et al., 2001), dual process theories (e.g. Evans, 2008), or in research on how the expected hedonistic
consequences of decisions are evaluated (e.g. Damasio, 1994). Our account fits well with such analyses.
Finally, it is clear that, while our account is still preliminary, our results are in agreement with other approaches that take
both lexical meaning and the communicative intentions of the verbal descriptions that produce the framing effect into
account. For example, McKenzie's (2003) review of how a Bayesian perspective that considers the relevance of frames
can explain the framing effect -- yet, not results such as those of the ADP -- and Kühberger's (1995) ideas that probabilistic
mental models of frames (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) can explain the ADP problem results. Fuzzy trace theory (Reyna and
Brainerd, 1991; Chick et al., 2016; Reyna et al., 2014) is yet another approach that explains framing effects in terms of two
types of representations of word meaning, called ‘gist’ and ‘verbatim’. Kühberger and Tanner (2010) convincingly point to
the need of combining this type of theoretical approach with notions such as information leakage in order to truly
understand what is going on in tasks such as the ADP. We may conclude that Prospect theory, which is a formal theory to
begin with, is simply not rich enough to explain what is going on. To this we add the importance of understanding the
linguistic subtleties of the ADP task relative to the evaluative power of the words, the role of negation and combinations of
descriptions in different constellations which in turn have different strengths of evaluative polarity in their wake.
By putting these pieces together, we hope to have made headway in our endeavors to develop a theory of the framing
effect where the evaluative contributions of words play an important part. If it turns out to be the case that attractive,
positive meanings have more power in decision making more generally than their negative counterparts, then new
avenues open up regarding the importance of participants’ emotional sensitivity to wording in decision making and the
relative power of positive descriptors over negative ones.
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